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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust is an ominous field of study.  Many legislative enactments, such as the 
Sherman Act1 and the Clayton Act,2 have shaped the scope and purpose of antitrust 
law, setting boundaries for the various businesses that affect the public.  The health 
care industry is constantly evolving in patient treatment and assessment, genetic 
research, and management and interaction of existing and emerging health care 
disciplines within health care facilities.  As a result of the evolution of health care, so 
too must the laws evolve to meet these changing needs. 
Many antitrust laws have been enacted since the Sherman Act of 1890.3  As a 
response to societal requirements, each antitrust statute either broadly encompasses 
business transactions or narrowly focuses on a particular industry.  This note 
                                                                
115 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997). 
215 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1997).    
3II ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1256 (4th ed. 
1997). 
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examines the antitrust developments that affect the health care industry; the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 19864 (hereinafter “HCQIA”); the treatment of 
peer review process immunity for physicians as it now exists; how non-physician 
providers are dealt with in the peer review process; and where physician assistants fit 
into the whole scheme.  
Part I of this note lays a foundation of antitrust principles, briefly explaining the 
applicable portions of the Sherman Act.  Next, the note sets forth the approaches, 
rule of reason versus per se rule,5 that courts utilize when dealing with antitrust 
situations.  After explaining these governing principles6 and citing examples, the 
note provides a brief history regarding health care, and antitrust strategies and 
approaches utilized by legal professionals in the health care area. 
Part I continues by setting forth the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, its purposes and goals, and practical applications to alleged antitrust violations.  
It also explores the limitations of the HCQIA, especially with respect to non-
physician providers.  Once the HCQIA foundation is in place, the note specifically 
speaks to typical contexts in which antitrust violations arise regarding non-physician 
providers, such as staff privileges granted through the peer review process. 
This note then reviews several cases to allow the reader a view into how non-
physician antitrust suits are handled in the court system, and to provide insight as to 
how physician assistants may be handled once that profession reaches for the 
protection of the antitrust statutes.  In part II of this note, a profile is constructed on 
physician assistants as a group, in order to lay a foundation regarding the impact they 
have on health care services.  Implications of case comparisons and relevant health 
care legislation are also examined. 
Part III concludes that physician assistants should be addressed separately from 
other non-physician providers by including physician assistants in the HCQIA, as a 
"measuring stick" from which courts can take their cues. 
                                                                
442 U.S.C. §§  11101-11152 (1997). 
5Gayle Reindl, Note, Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does the Quality of 
Care Justify Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1986).  Using the 
rule of reason approach, a court analyzes the challenged conduct in great detail, looks to the 
specific market, and weighs the procompetitive effects against the anticompetitive effects.  As 
a result of applying this rule of reason analysis to numerous antitrust actions, courts 
recognized certain practices that were repeatedly found to be anticompetitive in various 
contexts; therefore, these certain trade restrictions are considered per se illegal.  See Northern 
Pac. Ry. Co v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining that division of markets, group 
boycotts, tying arrangements, and price fixing are per se offenses). 
6Governing principles as set forth in case precedent focus on a results-oriented approach 
of handling these difficult types of antitrust violations.  With respect to the end result 
regarding antitrust injury, the Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977), stated:  
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts 
unlawful.  The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect . . . of the violation or of 
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.  It should, in short, be ‘the type of 
loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.’ 
(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/8
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II.  GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST ISSUES CONCERNING NON-PHYSICIAN 
PROVIDERS 
During the past two decades non-physician providers have brought the various 
antitrust ramifications of practicing in the medical community to the minds of the 
public.  Nurse practitioners, podiatrists, chiropractors, nurse midwives, nurse 
anesthetists, and other non-physician providers have alleged Sherman Act violations, 
with specific emphasis on restraint of trade, concerted refusals to deal, and group 
boycotts.  For example, a group boycott occurs when physicians who sit on hospital 
peer review boards deny hospital staff privileges to a group of physician assistants in 
a particular geographical area as a means to eliminate competition.  As a result of 
anticompetitive conduct, the occurrence of these antitrust suits will continue to 
increase as the services provided by these non-physicians also increase. 
Physician assistants are a group of non-physicians that have emerged as a likely 
candidate for antitrust issues due to their tandem work with physicians and because 
physician assistants have grown as a non-physician provider group and because these 
providers work in tandem with physicians.7  While no judicial precedent has been set 
for these providers and their future in the health care arena, the probability of 
antitrust claims regarding violations will increase as their numbers rise. 
A.  Health Care and Antitrust 
Beginning with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,8 which held that “learned 
professions” were not exempt from antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has held that 
antitrust liability laws apply to the health care industry.9  After the decision in 
Goldfarb, physicians who had been excluded from hospital medical staffs have used 
antitrust laws as “their weapon of choice.”10  On many occasions the Court has 
opined that health care providers' activities do, in fact, affect interstate commerce, 
and are reachable by antitrust laws.11 
Both individuals and organizational health care providers have engaged in joint 
ventures, mergers, and other collaborative activities to adapt to the rapidly changing 
face of the healthcare marketplace.12  An example of a joint venture is a cancer 
research center funded and operated by a cancer research hospital and a medical 
university, which are independent entities, but that join forces to form a separate 
                                                                
7Lou Falligant, Physician Assistants (PAs) Provide Quality Care, WIS. MED. J. June 1997, 
at 13. 
8421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
9II ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3 
10Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Antitrust Law and Privileging 
Decision, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 399, 403 (1996).  Note that during the five-year period after the 
Goldfarb decision, almost five times as many health care antitrust actions were brought than 
were brought in the eighty-five years since the Sherman Act was enacted.  Id. at 403-404. 
11ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3, at 1256.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982)(explaining that rules are set forth through 
the enactment of the Sherman Act regarding price-fixing agreements as they pertain to all 
industries). 
12ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3, at 1256. 
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company for a specific purpose, in this example, cancer research.  An example of a 
merger is the situation in which two groups of physicians merge the assets of both 
independent entities to form one entity—the former independent entities cease to 
exist. 
Another example of a collaborative activity is when an insurance company, 
which contracts with hospitals regarding medical insurance coverage, purchases a 
hospital.  Although these alliances provide efficient and cost effective services, they 
are also exposed to antitrust allegations of group boycotts, market division, restraint 
of trade and other traditional antitrust concerns.13 
From the defendant’s perspective, the type of defense available sets the 
“measuring stick” for handling future antitrust actions.  Typically, as in Crosby v. 
Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County,14 the centerpiece of the 
antitrust analysis regarding physicians denied privileges or having privileges 
terminated is the defense of immunity.  The immunity defense can take three 
different forms: [1] state action immunity under Parker v. Brown;15 [2] immunity 
under the Local Government Antitrust Act;16 and [3] immunity under the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act.17  As discussed later, immunity defenses impact the 
outcome of the antitrust allegations by either defending challenged conduct or by 
failing to provide a reasonable explanation for the challenged conduct. 
B.  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 
In 1986, in response to the “medical malpractice crisis” that allegedly dealt a 
severe blow to the medical community,18 Congress enacted the Health Care Quality 
                                                                
13ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3.  In 1996, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice issued the 1996 Health Care Statements.  These 
nine statements are guidelines for the various activities that are prevalent in the health care 
industry: [1] hospital mergers; [2] joint ventures involving high-tech health care equipment 
and hospitals; [3] joint ventures between expensive specialized health care services and 
hospitals; [4] “providers collective provision of fee-related information to purchasers of health 
care services”; [5] “providers collective provision of non-fee related information to purchasers 
of health care services”; [6] health care provider participation in information exchanges on 
price and cost; [7] collaborative purchasing arrangements among health care providers; [8] 
joint ventures involving physician networks; and [9] networks involving multiproviders.  Id. 
14873 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1995). 
15317 U.S. 341 (1943).  See Crosby, 873 F. Supp. at 1573.  “The Parker doctrine exempts 
only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, 
by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or 
monopoly public service.”  Id. at 1574 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light 
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 409 (1978)). 
1615 U.S.C. § 34(1)-(2)(1994).  See Crosby, 873 F. Supp. at 1581.  With the Local 
Government Antitrust Act (LGAA), a defendant, first, must be a “local government” or a 
"person" as those term are defined in the statute.  Then, second, the defendant, either a 
"person" or "local government," must cross claim on the basis that the action was taken in an 
official capacity.  Id.  
17The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1997). 
18Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, 
Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 457 (1990). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/8
1999] DETERMINING THE IMMUNITY “MEASURING STICK” 119 
Improvement Act (hereinafter “HCQIA”).  The HCQIA was derived from various 
bills that addressed several factors, including unrealistic public expectations of health 
care services, high medical malpractice insurance rates, expanded tort liability, and 
physicians’ overestimation of expected results in patient assessment and treatment.19 
The underpinning of the HCQIA is to provide a greater incentive for professional 
review bodies20 to engage in effective professional peer review of the quality of 
service provided by a physician, thus preventing incompetent physicians from 
locating to different geographical areas without disclosing their previous acts of 
damaging or incompetent performance.21  Additionally, another main objective set 
forth in the HCQIA is providing a limited form of immunity to these physicians on 
peer review boards to objectively evaluate physician qualifications without fear of 
antitrust allegations resulted in the implementation of a plan for reporting and 
collecting information regarding the actions taken against physicians.22 
The HCQIA has been hailed by some healthcare providers as providing shelter to 
hospitals where there previously was little protection.23  The immunity aspect 
included in the HCQIA, however, has left peer review boards24 with more exposure 
                                                                
19Id. at 457-58. 
2042 U.S.C. ' 11151(11) (1997).  HCQIA defines "professional review body" to mean a 
health care entity and the body or committee which governs the health care entity, which 
conducts the professional review process, including any committee of the medical staff of the 
health care entity.  Id. 
21Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152), 121 A.L.R. FED. 255, 264 (1994).  
Hospitals are required to obtain information from the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
whenever a physician submits for privileges, and every two years for those physicians who 
have privileges at that hospital.  Id. 
22Id. at 263-64. 
23Erskine, supra note 10, at 415.  See, e.g., Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934 (C.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
24The HCQIA defines the various terms used in the statute in the following manner.   
In this title: (1) The term “adversely affecting” includes reducing restricting, 
suspending, revoking, denying, or failing to renew clinical privileges or membership 
in a health care entity.  (2) The term “Board of Medical Examiners” includes a body 
comparable to such a Board (as determined by the State) with responsibility for the 
licensing of physicians and also includes a subdivision of such a Board or body.  (3) 
The term “clinical privileges” includes privileges, membership on the medical staff, 
and the other circumstances pertaining to the furnishing of medical care under which a 
physician or other licensed health care practitioner is permitted to furnish such care by 
a health care entity.  (4)(A) The term “health care entity” means—(i) a hospital that is 
licensed to provide health care services by the State in which it is located, (ii) an entity 
(including a health maintenance organization or group medical practice) that provides 
health care services and that follows a formal peer review process for the purpose of 
furthering quality health care (as determined under regulations of the Secretary), and 
(iii) subject to subparagraph (B), a professional society (or committee thereof) of 
physicians or other licensed health care practitioners that follow a formal peer review 
process for the purpose of furthering quality health care (as determined under 
regulations of the Secretary).  (4)(B) The term “health care entity” does not include a 
professional society (or committee thereof) if, within the previous 5 years, the society 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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than originally intended.  Section 11101 of the HCQIA, which sets forth the findings 
of Congress, has a narrow scope that only includes “a national need to restrict the 
ability of incompetent physicians . . . .”25 
From this section it can be construed that Congress determined that the 
responsibility for the medical malpractice crisis lay only at the feet of incompetent 
physicians.26  Because Congress intended to encourage physician participation in 
effective professional peer review processes,27 it granted immunity from antitrust 
                                                          
has been found by the Federal Trade Commission or any court to have engaged in any 
anti-competitive practice which had the effect of restricting the practice of licensed 
health care practitioners. 
42 U.S.C. § 11151 (1997). 
2542 U.S.C. § 11101(1)-(2).  Section 11101 contains the following congressional findings: 
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of 
medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can 
be undertaken by any individual State.  (2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of 
incompetent physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the 
physician's previous damaging or incompetent performance.  Id.  See also, Susan O. 
Scheutzow and Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review Information: 
More Imagined Than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 175-79 (1992-1993). 
26The HCQIA defines various terms used in the statute in the following manner: 
(5) The term “hospital” means an entity described in paragraphs (1) and (7) of section 
1861(e) of the Social Security Act.  (6) The term “licensed health care practitioner” 
and “practitioner” mean, with respect to a State, an individual (other than a physician) 
who is licensed or otherwise authorized by the State to provide health care services . . . 
(8) The term “physician” means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy or a doctor of 
dental surgery or medical dentistry legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery 
or dentistry by a State (or an individual who, without authority holds himself or herself 
out to be so authorized).  (9) The term “professional review action” means an action or 
recommendation of a professional review body which is taken or made in the conduct 
of professional review activity, which is based on the competence or professional 
conduct of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely 
the health or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect) 
adversely the clinical privileges, or membership in a professional society, of the 
physician.  Such term includes a formal decision of a professional review body not to 
take an action or  make a recommendation described in the previous sentence and also 
includes professional review activities relating to professional review action . . . .  (11) 
the term “professional review body” means a health care entity and the governing 
body or any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review 
activity, and includes any committee of the medical staff of such an entity when 
assessing the governing body in a professional review activity. 
42 U.S.C. ' 11151 (1997). 
27§ 11101(3)-(5). 
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional peer 
review.  (4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, 
including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably 
discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.  (5) 
There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians 
engaging in effective professional peer review. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/8
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actions for physicians who participate on peer review boards.  But Congress did not 
formally address the question of why non-physician providers were excluded from 
the HCQIA.  The granting of immunity requires that standards for professional 
review actions are complied with by review boards; otherwise, immunity will not 
shield physicians from liability.28 
Section 11112 of the HCQIA outlines the standards for professional review 
actions29 and specifies the responsibilities of the professional review board.30  The 
HCQIA speaks of physicians, as members of a peer review board, being immune 
from antitrust actions brought by physicians denied hospital staffing privileges.  
Thus, this immunity appears not to apply when a non-physician provider brings 
allegations of antitrust violations against physicians on professional review boards. 
Section 11115(c), states that nothing in the statute “shall be construed as 
affecting or modifying any Federal or State law, with respect to activities of 
professional review bodies regarding nurses, other licensed health care practitioners, 
or other health professionals who are not physicians.”31  Commentators have 
remarked that the exclusion of the non-physician providers was a major political 
compromise in enacting the HCQIA.32  Further, it is arguable that incompetence 
among non-physician providers may well be higher in incidence because of the 
limited educational and professional training as compared to physicians.33 
                                                          
Prior to the HCQIA and the immunity provision, physicians participating on professional peer 
review boards had the threat of private money damage liability, and although this act grants 
immunity, it is limited.  Id. 
28Smith, supra note 21, at 265.  See, e.g., Decker v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 982 F.2d 433 (10th 
Cir. 1992)(HCQIA establishes immunity only from liability, not from suit); Hancock v. Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield, 21 F.3d 373 (10th Cir. 1994). 
29Smith, supra note 21, at 264. 
[A] professional review action must be taken (1) in the reasonable belief that the 
action was in the furtherance of quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to 
obtain the facts of the manner, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are 
afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the 
physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the action was 
warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after 
meeting the requirements of paragraph (3).  A professional review action shall be 
presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in 
section 411(a) [42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)] unless the presumption is rebutted by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
§ 11112(a)(1)-(4). 
30Id. 
3142 U.S.C. § 11115(c) (1997).  The full text of this subsection reads: “(c) Treatment of 
nurses and other practitioners.  Nothing in this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 11111 et seq.] shall be 
construed as affecting, or modifying any provision of Federal or State law, with respect to 
activities of professional review bodies regarding nurses, or other licensed health care 
practitioners, or other health professionals who are not physicians.”  Id. 
32Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 738 (1991). 
33Id.  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act allows permissive reporting of actions 
taken against non-physician providers, but this is not a mandatory requirement. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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It is also arguable that the limited medical training corresponds to the more 
limited duties and discretion that non-physician providers have in providing services.  
Yet, physician assistants receive their training in accredited programs that 
matriculate anywhere from twelve months to forty-two months, depending on the 
state.34  This type of training program leads many physician assistants to have a 
limited autonomy with their physician “counterparts,” and in certain cases the 
physician assistants’ duties are not limited but enhanced.  The reasoning behind the 
exclusion of non-physician providers from the HCQIA is open to debate.  Given the 
fact that their inclusion was specifically considered and rejected, however, it is fair to 
presume that their exclusion was intentional and not due to oversight on the part of 
Congress. 
C.  Antitrust 
The Sherman Act of 189035 sets forth the basis for determining when an action 
constitutes an antitrust violation.  Specifically, Section One of the Sherman Act has 
been the basis for many antitrust suits brought regarding the health care industry.  In 
the most pertinent part of the Act, Section 1 provides: 
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust, or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall 
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, on 
conviction, thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million 
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments in the discretion of the court.36 
In the health care industry section one covers restraint of trade situations, such as 
a non-physician provider being denied access to hospital privileges due to a 
combination, contract or conspiracy of another group (e.g., a peer review board).37 
Courts use two approaches in determining Sherman Act violations: one, the “rule 
of reason”38 and two, the “per se” rule.39  Under the rule of reason, courts examine 
the challenged conduct to determine whether the restraint merely regulates and thus 
promotes competition, or whether it suppresses or destroys competition.40  Under the 
                                                                
34TERENCE J. SACKS, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CAREERS, 122-37 (1995). 
3526 Stat. 209 (1890)(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7). 
36The Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997). 
37See Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
38Although the statute reads “every contract . . .,” the Supreme Court held in Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), that section one should be interpreted to prohibit only 
those contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.  ANTITRUST 
ADVISOR 7 (Carla Anderson Hills ed., 3rd ed. 1985). 
39Id.  
40I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 52 (4th ed. 1997).  
In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the framework of the rule 
of reason was articulated by Justice Brandeis :  
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/8
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rule of reason, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the conduct is likely to have 
an adverse effect on competition, while the defendant must show the procompetitive 
objectives.41  Finally, the trier of fact must determine whether the procompetitive 
aspects outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the restraint.42  Thus many courts 
now have eliminated their in-depth analyses of the challenged conduct that has 
already been decided in court, and instead have limited the application of the per se 
rule to categories that require no further in-depth analysis in determining that the 
nature and effect of the conduct are obviously anticompetitive.43 
The second analytical approach under section one of the Sherman Act, the “per 
se” rule,44 addresses violations that are so obviously anticompetitive that they are 
considered illegal without further examination into the reasons for their existence.45  
Because of the emphasis placed on economics as a viable part of the analysis for per 
se violations, the per se doctrine has lost much of the momentum it gained early in its 
history.46 
The determination of labeling an activity per se illegal depends upon the nature 
of the restraint.47  Due to the diverse business practices and the new business 
developments that constantly emerge onto the business scene, courts are having a 
harder time designating an activity as illegal per se.  Courts have determined that 
lengthy explorations into the questionable activity along with market factors and 
practices that surround the activity are not a viable approach.48  As a result of the 
movement away from the per se rule, many lower courts have been uncertain as to 
which rule to use in their analysis of cases. 
                                                          
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition.  To determine that question the court must ordinarily 
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.  The history 
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting that particular 
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 
41ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 53.  See, e.g., Higgins v. Med. 
College, 849 F. Supp. 1113, 1121-1122 (E.D. Va. 1994); Hassan v. Indep. Practice Assoc., 
689 F. Supp. 679, 690 (E.D. Mich. 1988). 
42ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 53. 
43ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 45.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Med Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
44ANTITRUST ADVISOR 7 (3rd ed. 1985). 
45Id.  See also, National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); 
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).  
46ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1-2 (3rd ed. 1985 and Supp. 1993).  See Business Electronics Corp. 
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
47ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 44. 
48Id. at 44-45.  See also, FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) 
(“[W]e have been slow . . . to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of 
business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately 
obvious.”). 
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In 1984, the Supreme Court modified the rule of reason's interpretation to a 
“quick look” approach.49  Under this “quick look” rule of reason approach, the 
plaintiff does not bear the initial burden of the restraint's anticompetitive effects 
because the challenged behavior is presumed to be anticompetitive.50  Instead, the 
defendant has the burden to prove that there existed procompetitive defenses for the 
restraining conduct.51  If the defendant is unsuccessful in proving such justification, 
then the restraint is judged to be illegal without further examination.52 
For example in 1985, a United States District Court noted that the distinction 
between the rule of reason and the per se rule has never been completely clear.53  
Further, the court indicated that factors such as market power and the probable 
effects of the alleged restraint on competition must be considered as part of a 
truncated rule of reason analysis before deciding to apply the per se rule.54  In 
summary, courts are still trying to maintain two categories of approaches to use, 
otherwise, all cases would require in-depth analysis.55  The movement towards the 
rule of reason is obvious.  This approach is workable in more situations at the center 
of antitrust violations, whereas per se analysis requires the restraint to be 
conclusively presumed unreasonable.56 
D.  Antitrust Implications for Non-Physician Providers 
Antitrust problems are nowhere more prevalent than in the area of granting staff 
privileges at hospitals or clinics.  The crux of this type of antitrust case is the 
hospital's or clinic staff's decision to deny privileges to the non-physician provider.57  
The contexts in which staff privilege antitrust suits arise include, (1) the denial of 
initial privileges to the clinic or hospital, (2) the refusal to renew the provider's 
                                                                
49Id.  See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (“But 
whether the ultimate finding is the product of presumption or actual market analysis, the 
essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the challenged restraint enhances 
competition."). 
50ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 53. 
51Id. 
52Id.  See, e.g., United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (explaining that absent a showing of anticompetitive effect, it is unnecessary to 
analyze motives or procompetitive benefits of allegedly anticompetitive conduct). 
53Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1244 (D. Del. 1985) (explaining that 
physician sued the hospital which had denied him staff privileges, alleging that the denial 
constituted a group boycott in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).  See Note, Fixing the 
Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706 (1983) (arguing the 
problematic nature of distinction between rule of reason and per se rule analysis). 
54Quinn, 617 F. Supp. at 1244.  See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85 (1984) (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before 
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
55ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 40, at 43. 
56Id.  See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
57John J. Miles, Antitrust, Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions and Hospital Joint Ventures, 
17 U. TOL. L. REV. 873, 875 (1986). 
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privileges, (3) the suspension of privileges, (4) the reduction of privileges, (5) the 
granting of limited privileges, (6) the termination of privileges, (7) the denial of 
status upgrade in privileges, and (8) the denial of privileges because of an exclusive 
contract with another provider who provides the same services as that of the denied 
applicant.58  Categories one through seven form the basis of a claim that the hospital 
or clinic and/or certain staff members acted in concert to exclude the non-physician 
provider from gaining access to the hospital or clinic, and, therefore, engaged in a 
group boycott.59  Category eight deals with exclusive contract claims, which result in 
tying arrangements60 between the hospital or clinic and its patients in need of the 
particular service provided.61  For example, a patient requires a surgical procedure 
and goes to hospital A to have it performed, hospital A also provides the anesthesia 
services necessary for the surgery.  This additional service for anesthesia is only 
performed by hospital A, whereby the patient does not have a choice of anesthesia 
providers.  Thus, this service is tied to the main surgical service provided. 
1.  Peer Review and Staff Privileges 
The peer review process has given rise to many antitrust claims.  Courts have 
recognized that the peer review process has the potential of enhancing competition 
by promoting efficient and effective health care services provided only by qualified 
and competent health care practitioners.62  There is also, however, the risk of 
anticompetitive abuse through the peer review process and the granting of 
privileges.63  In other words, the physicians that sit on the peer review board can 
eliminate their prospective competitors through this process.  The granting of staff 
privileges to independent non-physician providers is essential if these non-physicians 
                                                                
58Id. at 876. 
59Id. at 876-77. 
60
“A tying arrangement is defined as one in which one party conditions the sale or license 
of a product [or service] (the tying product) upon the sale or license of another product [or 
service] (the tied product) or agrees not to obtain the tied product from another supplier.”  
ANTITRUST ADVISOR 5-39 (Irving Scher ed., 4th ed. 1995). 
61Miles, supra note 57, at 877.  
62ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3, at 1257.  See also, Quinn v. Kent Gen. 
Hosp. Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1239 (D. Del. 1985)(“[A] peer review process is arguably 
procompetitive, for by monitoring the qualifications and performances of physicians it may 
compensate for the relative lack of information about these matters by consumers.”); Willman 
v. Heartland Hosp. E., 34 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1994) (arguing that public interest to monitor 
physician quality of care and competence through the peer review process, and to revoke 
privileges because of legitimate concerns of competency issues are lawful objectives). 
63ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 3, at 1257.  See also Johnson v. Nyack 
Hosp., 891 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the power that professional 
review boards wield may be abused for many reasons, including personal animus and 
anticompetitive motives), aff'd, 86 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1996); Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 
1506 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The peer review process allows doctors to agree to eliminate a 
competitor from the market because they believe his or her product is substandard.”), rev'd on 
other grounds, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
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desire to provide services at a hospital or clinic.64  But this desire may be thwarted 
during the peer review process. 
Although specific procedures may vary from hospital to hospital, there exist 
some general similarities in the peer review process.65  The credentialling committee 
of the hospital or clinic undertakes an investigation into the applicant's background 
to determine the extent of his/her board certification and licensing, medical 
malpractice insurance (current policy), and medical training and experience.66  This 
committee reports the findings of its investigation to the whole medical staff, or to 
the board of directors, which makes the final decision based on the committee's 
recommendation.67 
If a non-physician provider is denied privileges, the hospital or clinic usually will 
provide an opportunity for review and appeal of the decision.68  If the appeal process 
proves to be unsuccessful for the non-physician provider, the provider may make 
antitrust allegations against the hospital and/or medical staff.69  To be successful in 
an antitrust action, the claimant must satisfy all the requirements of Section One of 
the Sherman Act.  These requirements are: [1] combination, conspiracy or contract 
among two or more independent actors; [2] unreasonable restraint of trade; and [3] 
substantially affects interstate markets.70 
2.  Non-Physician Providers Case Analysis 
Judicial precedent has yet to be established regarding physician assistant antitrust 
treatment.  A comparative analysis using nurse midwives and nurse anesthetists and 
the outcomes of their antitrust challenges provide a view into the future.  The focal 
point of this analysis is the approach that the courts have used in the types of 
antitrust actions in which the peer review processes at health care entities are under 
attack by non-physician providers who have lost or been denied staff privileges.  In 
the first case discussed,71 the outcome hinges on the conspiracy aspect of restraint of 
trade cases and on sorting out its applicability to the various involved parties. 
The second case analysis discusses, in-depth, jurisdictional issues, conspiracy 
evidence and proof, defenses asserted, and proof of treble damages.72  The third case 
analysis focuses on the rule of reason approach in determining if the restraint of trade 
was unreasonable.73  The courts imply through their opinions that the non-physician 
provider is denied staff privileges whereby the opportunity for providing his/her 
                                                                
64Erskine, supra note 10, at 399. 
65John Neff, Note, Physician Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 613 (1988). 
66Id. at 614. 
67Id.  
68Id. 
69Id. at 614-15. 
70ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 60, at 1-7. 
71Nurse Midwifery Assoc. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
72Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr, 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
73Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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services is either eliminated in the relevant market or substantially diminished.74  
This leads to the conclusion that recovery in an antitrust action of this nature is most 
likely when the non-physician provider’s ability to compete in his/her relevant 
market has been eliminated or substantially diminished.  The cases analyzed below 
discuss this possibility. 
a.  Nurse Midwife Case Analysis 
i.  Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett 
In Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett,75 nurse midwives76 and other named 
plaintiffs, brought an action alleging that the defendants77 had engaged in 
conspiracies to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act, § 1.78  The District 
Court held that (1) the plaintiffs failed to support their claim of an illegal conspiracy 
between the university hospital and the obstetrician/gynecologist (OB/GYN);79 (2) 
the insurance company and the insureds, the physicians, were capable of 
conspiring;80 (3) the doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy81 did not apply to the claim 
that OB/GYNs conspired with other OB/GYNs and with the medical staff, and (4) 
the doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy barred claims that the hospitals conspired 
with pediatricians on their medical staffs.82  Plaintiffs' case focused on the 
physicians' attempt to eliminate the competition of the nurse midwives by conspiring 
to prevent them from operating a maternity practice and to prevent them from 
                                                                
74See, e.g., Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr, 705 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
75Nurse Midwifery Assoc. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
76
“[A]n individual educated in the two disciplines of nursing and midwifery [independent 
management of newborns and women], who possesses evidence of certification according to 
the requirements of the American College of Nurse-Midwifes.”  DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1163 (28th ed. 1994). 
77Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 605.  Hibbett, M.D.; Shackleford, M.D.; Andrews, 
M.D.; Melkin, M.D.; Baer, M.D.; State Volunteer Mutual Insurance Company; Vanderbilt 
University Hospital; Southern Hills Hospital; and Hendersonville Community Hospital.  All 
defendants are located in the Nashville, Tennessee area. 
78Id. at 607. 
79Id. at 616.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 
(1986). 
80Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 616.  See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 
457 U.S. 332, 356-357 (1982). 
81In 1984, the Court considered the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when it decided 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that “allowing 
plaintiffs to bring antitrust claims against single firms, claiming an “intra-enterprise” 
conspiracy would erode the distinction Congress had intended between sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.”) (quoting Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Antitrust 
Law and Privileging Decision, 44 KAN. L. REV. 399, 407 (1996)). 
82Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 613.  See e.g., Smith v. Northern Michigan Hosp. 
Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 950 (6th Cir. 1983); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr, 851 F.2d 1273, 1280 
(11th Cir. 1988). 
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receiving hospital staff privileges so that they could provide maternity services.83  
The plaintiffs claimed that competition was eliminated when the defendants put 
pressure on the supervising physicians,84 who collaborate with the nurse midwives in 
practice, and also put pressure on the hospital boards, who grant staff privileges to 
the nurse midwives through the peer review board process.85  As a result of this 
conspiracy, the plaintiffs were unable to continue their midwifery practice, and filed 
suit alleging antitrust violations.86 
In order to establish antitrust violations under section one of the Sherman Act, 
the plaintiffs “must establish that the defendants combined or conspired with an 
intent to unreasonably restrain trade.”87  The plaintiff must prove that the allegedly 
violative conduct transpired between two independent entities, because section one 
does not reach “unilateral conduct” even if it unreasonably restrains trade.88  The 
Nurse Midwifery Assoc. court explained that conspiracies occur when independent 
entities have joined to act in the mutual benefit of all entities.89  This combination 
may benefit consumers as well, but the anticompetitive potential warrants antitrust 
scrutiny.90  Additionally, the court also examined the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine and its application to the instant case.91 
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine92 is a collection of rules that govern the 
conduct between corporations and their agents or employees, or between parent 
corporations and wholly owned subsidiaries.93  For example, an agreement between 
officers and employees of a corporation usually does not constitute a section one 
conspiracy because each group is neither independent of the other, nor does it have 
separate economic interests.94  The same is true of the parent company and its wholly 
owned subsidiary, when both agree to a specific course of action, then section one 
scrutiny is not justified because there is “no sudden joining of economic resources 
that had previously served different interests.”95  Courts have come down on both 
                                                                
83Id. at 608. 
84Id.  In order for nurse-midwives to provide patient care, they must have a supervising 
physician qualified in obstetrics who takes responsibility for the medical care provided. 
85Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 608. 
86Id. at 611. 
87Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 611 (quoting, Smith v. N. Mich. Hosp., 703 F.2d 
942, 949 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
88Id. at 611-12.  Unilateral conduct is governed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which 
states in its relevant part: “unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.”  Id. 
89
  
90Id. at 612. 
91Id. 
92See e.g., Milton Handler and Thomas A. Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate 
Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981). 
93Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 612. 
94Id. at 612. 
95Id. 
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sides of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when applying the various facets of 
that doctrine to antitrust statutes.96  Some courts have found that the doctrine of 
intracorporate conspiracy does not preclude a finding that collaborative activities 
rising to the level of conspiracy have occurred between a hospital and its medical 
staff.97 
After a court has found the challenged conduct to be a conspiracy, then it will 
determine if the conduct is unreasonable.98  Along this line of analysis, the court, in 
Nurse Midwifery Assoc., found that some of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims had merit 
and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with the Court of Appeals’ decision.99 
ii.  Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center 
In Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center,100 the plaintiff, a certified nurse 
midwife, brought antitrust claims under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act,101 as 
well as state law claims against a public hospital and doctor partners in a 
professional group alleging restraint of trade violations.102  The district court held, in 
relevant part to this note: (1) the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied to 
establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act;103 (2) the evidence of conspiracy raised 
factual questions and; therefore, summary judgment was denied for the “no evidence 
                                                                
96Id. 
97Id.  See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr, 851 F.2d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 
1988)(reasoning that members of a hospital’s medical staff are capable of conspiring, because 
each member of the staff “is a separate economic entity potentially in competition with other 
physicians”); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813-17 (3d Cir. 1984)(explaining that 
members of a medical staff could conspire among themselves because they were not only 
practicing medicine they were competing with each other).  The Weiss court stated:  
[A] conspiracy involving a corporation and one of its agents would occur every time 
an agent performed some act in the course of his agency, for such an act would be 
deemed an act of the corporation . . . [a] hospital and the members of its medical staff, 
in contrast, are legally separate entities, and consequently no similar danger exists that 
what is in fact unilateral activity will be bootstrapped into a conspiracy. 
Id. at 819 (citing Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Antitrust Law and 
Privileging Decisions, 44 KAN. L. REV. 399, 409 (1996)).  These courts opined that for the 
purposes of antitrust liability, member of a hospital's medical staff are more than just agents of 
the hospital. 
98Nurse Midwifery Assoc., 918 F.2d at 612. 
99Id. at 617. 
100Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
10138 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44). 
102Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1567. 
103Id. at 1571.  The court stated that Sweeney's relationship to interstate commerce in 
combination with the business activities of the physicians adequately shows that those 
activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Id. 
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of conspiracy” defense;104 (3) the plaintiff sufficiently established causation under 
Section IV of the Clayton Act for treble damages;105 and (4) the physicians’ defenses 
failed against plaintiff.106 
Sweeney mainly focused on the independent physician groups’ collaborative 
activities to eliminate competition by denying plaintiff staff privileges and the effects 
on plaintiff's occupation.  In 1982, plaintiff Sweeney had held staff privileges at 
defendant hospitals as a labor and delivery nurse and midwife, had received a 
masters degree in nurse midwifery,107 and had taught obstetrics nursing at the 
medical school.108  In 1985, Sweeney established a private business which provided 
alternative childbearing options for women in the relevant market.109 
In fall of 1985, after Sweeney advertised her alternative childbearing methods, 
one of the physicians who provided back-up obstetrical care terminated his services 
with Sweeney's patients.110  At the same time, the physicians that comprised the 
obstetrics departments at the two defendant hospitals met jointly to discuss 
Sweeney’s business.111  The obstetricians at the two hospitals wrote a joint letter to 
the hospitals’ administrators expressing the position that Sweeney’s medical practice 
must be eliminated.112  In early 1986, the physicians of one of the hospitals agreed to 
deny Sweeney patient access, and formalized this agreement in a letter to the nursing 
director of that hospital.113  As a result of the restrictive nature of these actions, 
Sweeney’s private childbirth business and teaching opportunities were greatly 
diminished.114 
The court thoroughly analyzed the plaintiff’s claims and, starting with the 
Sherman Act, noted that, in order “[t]o invoke the jurisdiction of the Sherman 
Act, . . . a plaintiff [must] show (1) that the local activity has a (2) substantial affect 
                                                                
104Id. at 1572-73.  The factual evidence “tends to exclude the possibility that the 
[defendants] were acting independently.”  Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 
764 (1984). 
105Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1574.  The established causation precluded the court from 
ruling as a matter of law that Sweeney can prove no actual damages; therefore, Sweeney had 
the obligation of proving damages at trial.  Id. 
106Id. at 1574-76.  The quality of care defense, illegal business defense, burden of proof 
defense, and the incapable of conspiring defense all failed for the defendant physicians.  Id. 
107See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
108Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr, 705 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
109Id. at 1558.  The business was called “Family Birth.”  The business’ purpose was to 
have midwives, not physicians, provide the prenatal care as well as complete delivery services, 
as an alternative to traditional prenatal care.  Id. 
110Id. at 1559. 
111Id. at 1563, 1567. 
112Id. at 1568. 
113Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1569.  The Hospital officials honored this request in denying 
Sweeney patient access, as a nurse midwife. 
114Id. 
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on (3) interstate commerce.”115  The court explained that to satisfy the jurisdiction 
requirement, the defendants’ activities in aggregate must have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce or markets.116 
Further, the court explained that under the Sherman Act, in order to prove 
conspiracy, the plaintiff must produce evidence that reasonably tends to prove that 
defendants “had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve 
an unlawful objective.”117  In addition, the evidence must show that the defendants 
were acting in accord with one another—mutually assenting.118 
Next the court noted that in order for the plaintiff to recover treble damages 
under the Clayton Act,119 the plaintiff must initially show that standing exists, and 
then that any injury suffered bears a close relationship to the alleged antitrust 
violation.120  To determine the relevant market in question the court used the “target 
area test,” which states that to establish the requisite “close relationship” between the 
harm and the violative conduct, the plaintiff must show that both the harm and the 
conduct are within the market zone threatened by the alleged anticompetitive 
activity.121  The court then determines whether the injury actually occurred within the 
target area.122 
Finally, the court analyzed the various defenses asserted by the defendant 
physicians.  The “patient care” defense, as asserted by these defendants, built its 
legal basis on Wilk v. American Medical Association,123 in which the court had held 
that doctors were allowed to share a common view, i.e. agreeing to not associate with 
a chiropractor in their health care team approach in treating a patient because the 
                                                                
115Id. at 1570 (citing Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
116Id.  See Shahawy, 778 F.2d at 640-641. 
117Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1572.  See also Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 
752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d 
Cir. 1980)). 
118Id. at 1572. 
119The Act reads in relevant part: 
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefore in the United States 
district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, 
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold [treble] the 
damages by it sustained and the cost of suit.  The court may award . . . threefold the 
damages. 
15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1997). 
120Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1574.  See Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract and Title, Inc., 758 
F.2d 1486, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1985). 
121Id. at 1574.  The court identifies the area of the economy threatened by the alleged 
antitrust activity and then determines if the plaintiff's injury occurred within the target market.  
Id.  See Amey, 758 F.2d at 1500. 
122Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1574.  Sweeney’s private business was in competition as a 
childbirth alternative in the area; plaintiff was within the target area—the market threatened by 
the alleged violation.  Id. 
123719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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quality of care they provide outweighs that of the chiropractor.124  But the Sweeney 
court further noted that Supreme Court precedent does not support the application of 
the patient care defense.125  While the Sweeney defendants argued that they were 
incapable of conspiring because they were partners in a partnership,126 the court 
opined that the two independent partnerships conspired, and this action brought them 
within the scope of the Sherman Act.  The court also analyzed other issues that are 
not applicable for the purposes of this note.  The court ultimately allowed the 
plaintiff's claims under the antitrust laws. 
b.  Nurse Anesthetists Case Analysis:  Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hospital 
In Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hospital,127 the plaintiff, a nurse anesthetist, 
brought an antitrust action against the hospital and the anesthesiologists after he was 
terminated because of an exclusive staff arrangement between the hospital and the 
anesthesiologists, which implied that all other anesthesia providers would not be 
granted privileges at the hospital.128  After applying the rule of reason approach to 
determine whether plaintiff should prevail,129 the appellate court held that the 
plaintiff's antitrust claims had merit.130 
The court set forth the three elements that must be proven by the plaintiff for 
success under a section one claim: (1) a conspiracy or mutual assent among two or 
more individuals or entities; (2) the individuals or entities intended to injure or 
restrain competition; and (3) competition is injured.131  Once it has been proven that 
                                                                
124Id. at 226. 
125Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1575.  See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'r v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 695-96 (1978) (“Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and 
services would be tantamount to the repeal of the statute . . . .  The judiciary cannot indirectly 
protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly privileges on the [defendants].”). 
126Sweeney, 709 F. Supp. at 1576 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 
U.S. 332, 356 (1982)). 
127Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1988).  St. 
Peter’s is only one of two hospitals in the Greater Helena, Montana area and because it is the 
only hospital open to the public for general surgery, it boasts a market share of 84% for 
general surgical service in the relevant local market.  Id.  
128Id.  Mr. Oltz was employed as a free lance nurse anesthetist, who administered the 
anesthesia under the supervision of a physician.  When he started at the defendant/hospital, 
there were three anesthesiologists on the medical staff.  Eventually the number of 
anesthesiologists increased to four.  The evidence at the trial showed that Oltz was in direct 
competition with the anesthesiologists for the anesthesia services.  (The anesthesiologists 
settled out of the suit before trial.)  Id. 
129Id. at 1445.  This court concluded that [1] the defendant (St. Peter’s) did not prove the 
grounds for reversal nor did they lack capacity to conspire with the anesthesiologists; [2] the 
trial court properly defined the relevant market; [3] the evidence of conspiracy, intent, and 
injury to competition presented at the trial supports the jury findings; and [4] the plaintiff 
failed to establish ground for reversing the order granting a new trial on damages.  Id. at 1452-
53. 
130Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1452-53. 
131Id. at 1445. 
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the conspiracy has injured competition, the trier of fact must balance the restraint 
against any procompetitive justifications to determine whether the restraint is 
unreasonable.132  A closer look at the court's analysis of the rule of reason elements is 
appropriate. 
In this case, in order to satisfactorily prove conspiracy under section one of the 
Sherman Act, it required a showing that St. Peter’s Hospital had conspired with the 
anesthesiologists.  Courts have split on whether a hospital is legally capable of 
conspiring with its medical staff under section one of the Sherman Act.133  The Oltz 
court relied on an Eleventh Circuit decision134 to determine that the interests of the 
anesthesiologists were that of independent contractors pursuing their economic 
interests when they pressured St. Peter's into eliminating plaintiff as a direct 
competitor.135   
In effect, the anesthesiologists and St. Peter’s coalesced their economic power.136  
In other words, because the hospital held the power to terminate the plaintiff and to 
award an exclusive contract to the anesthesiologists, the hospital was not acting 
under the guise of an employer relationship and, therefore, could conspire with the 
anesthesiologists.137  This concerted action by the hospitals and the anesthesiologists 
to eliminate the direct competition of Oltz evidenced the co-conspirators' intent to 
restrain competition.138 
The second element in section one analysis is that the individuals or entities 
intended to injure or to restrain competition.139  The rule of reason approach requires 
that each challenged activity be evaluated in light of the special circumstances 
involved.140  Evidence supported the claim that St. Peter's and the anesthesiologists 
conspired to terminate the plaintiff's billing contract as well as to enter into an 
exclusive contract.141 
The third element of a section one claim, proof of injury or harm to competition, 
requires that the plaintiff prove the relevant market’s effects upon competition.142  
The relevant market encompasses the geographical aspects of the product or service 
                                                                
132Id.  See also Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
133Oltz, 861 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988). 
134Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 851 F.2d 1273, 1276-77, 1280 (11th Cir. 1988). 
135Oltz, 861 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988). 
136Id. 
137Id. at 1450. 
138The Oltz court opined that the decision made cannot be read to set forth a rule 
applicable to other situations involving rural hospitals engaged in exclusive agreements 
regarding staff privileges.  Id. at 1449. 
139Id. at 1445. 
140Id. at 1449.  See also, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 
717 (1988).   
141Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1449.  
142Id. at 1445-46.  See also Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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as well as the use, description, and quality.143  That market encompasses the “area of 
effective competition . . . where buyers can turn for alternate sources of supply.”144  
The Oltz court determined that the relevant market was Helena because St. Peter's 
would be the sole market server where an anesthesia specialist could provide 
services.145  The evidence showed that patients had no reasonable substitute for 
anesthesia services and that patients could not effectively go outside the relevant 
market for alternate sources.146  Although defining the relevant market is not the aim 
of antitrust law, it does offer a “measuring stick” to determine reasonable and 
unreasonable restraints.147  Thus, the evidence supported the element of intent to 
harm competition. 
The overall anticompetitive effect was that St. Peter’s and the anesthesiologists 
obtained power through the exclusive agreement to raise prices and to exclude 
competition, thereby, increasing their incomes and eliminating all other competitors 
in the market.148  Through this rule of reason analysis, the Oltz court found that the 
conspiracy, intent, and injury to competition aspects had been proven, and, thus, 
affirmed the district court's decision.149 
III.  PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS AND ANTITRUST: IMPLICATIONS OF CASE COMPARISONS 
AND RELEVANT HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION 
Physician assistants are trained health care professionals who provide medical 
care under a physician’s supervision, however limited, these services are 
substitutable with physician services.150  Statistics from the American Academy of 
Physician Assistants indicate that, as of 1993, there were approximately 23,500 
practicing physician assistants in the United States.151 
The statistical profile of these 23,500 physician assistants was as follows:152 
 
Gender:  58% male, 42% female 
Age:  40 years average 
Education: 85% have a 4 year college degree 
Specialty: 25% surgery 
56% primary care 
                                                                
143Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446. 
144Id.  See Moore v. Matthews and Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Otter 
Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) and Standard Oil Co v. United States, 
337 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1949)). 
145Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1447. 
146Id. 
147Id. at 1448.  St. Peter’s and the anesthesiologists had no competition in providing their 
services in the relevant market when they eliminated Oltz through their exclusive contract.  Id. 
148Id. 
149Id. at 1452-53. 
150Falligant, supra note 7, at 13. 
151TERENCE J. SACKS, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CAREERS, 19 (1995).  
152Id. at 19-21. 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/8
1999] DETERMINING THE IMMUNITY “MEASURING STICK” 135 
• 33% family practice 
• 9% general internal medicine 
• 9% emergency medicine 
• 3% obstetrics/gynecology 
• 2% pediatrics 
Setting:   75% outpatient 
25% inpatient 
Patient visits/day:          22 outpatient, 14 inpatient 
Average annual salary:  $53,000 
 
In a time when people are living longer, the unmet demands of medical care have 
caused the medical community to expand its ranks to include many diversified and 
efficient providers, such as physician assistants.153  As a result of this need, physician 
assistants have become an integral part of the health care industry.  Physician 
assistants provide services traditionally provided by physicians that are now being 
provided effectively and efficiently by these non-physician providers, such as writing 
prescriptions, which is permitted in more than thirty states.154  Physician assistants 
exercise a degree of autonomy in the diagnosis and treatment of illness and injury.155  
While some members of the medical community may embrace these physician 
assistants and their invaluable service to patients, others try to deal with them using a 
different approach. 
This author's research has not yielded a case that deals with antitrust issues 
involving physician assistants.156  But as this specialty field expands, through the 
various accreditation programs throughout the United States, so too will the many 
antitrust problems that have already affected other non-physician providers.157 
From the analysis of cases involving nurse midwives and nurse anesthetists, and 
the relevant health care legislation, many general applications can be made to non-
physician providers as a group, especially physician assistants.  The case analysis 
                                                                
153Falligant, supra note 7, at 13.  “[L]iterature indicates that PAs can substitute for 
physicians anywhere from 75% to 90% of the physician's primary care functions.”  Id. 
154Prerna Mona Khanna, Medicine: While Physician Extenders Proliferate, Doctors Worry 
About Competition, Care, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1992, at B1. 
155Falligant, supra note 7, at 13. 
156But see Gilliam v. National Comm'n for Certification of Physician Assistants, Inc., 727 
F. Supp. 1512 (E.D. Pa. 1989).  The case is unrelated to this note and therefore it carries no 
weight in the analysis of this note.  The substance of the physician assistant’s claim is based 
on being denied recertification of his license.  Although plaintiff brought a claim under 
antitrust laws, the court ruled that the claim had no merits, because plaintiff was not injured. 
157See generally TERENCE J. SACKS, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CAREERS, 19 
(1995); Lou Falligant, Physician Assistants (PAs) Provide Quality Care, WIS. MED. J. June 
1997, at 13; Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 683 (1991); Gayle Reindl, Note, Denying Hospital 
Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 
IND. L. REV. 1219 (1986); John J. Miles, Antitrust, Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions and 
Hospital Joint Ventures, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 873 (1986); Scott M. Smith, J.D., Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 11101-11152), 121 A.L.R. FED. 255 (1994);  Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and 
Round Holes: Antitrust Law and Privileging Decision, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 399(1996). 
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and the examination of relevant legislation, such as the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act, points to the conclusion that legislation seems to be lacking in a 
very important common aspect.158  This aspect will continue to draw the line between 
how courts will handle non-physician antitrust suits in comparison with physician 
antitrust suits.159  The aspect is immunity. 
The peer review process does not offer physicians or other peer review board 
members immunity in the process of reviewing non-physician providers for staff 
privileging situations; ultimately the central issue of the antitrust action is that a 
physician or a non-physician provider was denied privileges or had privileges that 
were terminated.160  For example, a physician assistant applies for privileges at a 
hospital and is denied these privileges and seeks relief under the antitrust laws; the 
peer review board (consisting of two physicians, an administrator, a nurse and a 
physician assistant) is not granted immunity for its decision in denying the physician 
assistant privileges.161  Conversely, if a physician seeks privileges and is denied, 
although that physician may seek redress under antitrust laws, the same peer review 
board is immune from the action.162  This distinction has major ramifications for the 
health care industry.  Because Congress eliminated the proposed provision of the 
HCQIA which would have granted immunity to peer review boards regarding 
reviews of non-physician providers, it has, in effect, left it to the courts to determine 
whether the peer review process is an effective means to evaluate non-physician 
providers for staff privileges through the use of physicians.163 
Unfortunately, the “measuring stick” for these two groups—physicians and non-
physicians—will not be identical; thus, different standards must be applied to the 
groups respectively.164  There are procompetitive and anticompetitive reasons for 
denying staff privileges to non-physicians.165 




161See generally TERENCE J. SACKS, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CAREERS, 19 
(1995); Lou Falligant, Physician Assistants (PAs) Provide Quality Care, WIS. MED. J. June 
1997, at 13; Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 683 (1991); Gayle Reindl, Note, Denying Hospital 
Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 
IND. L. REV. 1219 (1986); John J. Miles, Antitrust, Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions and 
Hospital Joint Ventures, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 873 (1986); Scott M. Smith, J.D., Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 11101-11152), 121 A.L.R. FED. 255 (1994); Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and 
Round Holes: Antitrust Law and Privileging Decision, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 399(1996). 
162Id. 
163Adler, supra note 32, at 738.  The political decision to eliminate the provision of 
HCQIA that dealt with non-physician providers, was a means for Congress to shift the burden 
to the judicial branch.  Id. 
164See generally TERENCE J. SACKS, OPPORTUNITIES IN PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT CAREERS, 19 
(1995); Lou Falligant, Physician Assistants (PAs) Provide Quality Care, WIS. MED. J. June 
1997, at 13; Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 683 (1991); Gayle Reindl, Note, Denying Hospital 
Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 
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First, non-physician groups that must be supervised by physicians add costs to 
the hospital's ability to provide its patients with quality care at an effective cost.166  
For example, a physician assistant may cause the hospital to incur an expense for 
his/her supervision by a physician because of the physician assistant’s ability to 
provide services “above” that of a nurse but “below” the level of a physician—the 
physician assistant has limited autonomy in relation to that of the supervising 
physician.  When physicians consult on other physicians’ patients, the costs of this 
“supervision consultation”167 are not unduly burdensome to the health care facility 
because it is viewed as a normal course of action.168  Yet, physician assistants have 
the ability to act independently in the health care facility, while providing services 
generally performed by physicians, such as writing prescriptions for medication.169  
The expenses associated with supervising physician assistants, however, may contain 
additional costing aspects, such as increased insurance rates, because of the increased 
level of patient treatment.170  Additionally, the training and types of services 
provided by physician assistants tend to make similar physicians and physician 
assistants with respect to costs. 
Second, physicians provide consumers with the ability to choose the type of care 
through the quality of care issues attached to physicians’ services.171  The ability for 
a consumer to choose physician services provides a basis for the quality of care 
defense, such that if consumers want changes in the choices of medical services 
available, then the consumers will influence market forces to make the necessary 
changes.172 
Finally, an antitrust action involving a physician usually involves only one 
physician as plaintiff, but non-physician provider groups are bringing antitrust claims 
                                                          
IND. L. REV. 1219 (1986); John J. Miles, Antitrust, Hospital Staff Privilege Decisions and 
Hospital Joint Ventures, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 873 (1986); Scott M. Smith, J.D., Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 11101-11152), 121 A.L.R. FED. 255 (1994);Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and 
Round Holes: Antitrust Law and Privileging Decision, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 399(1996). 
165Id. 
166Gayle Reindl, Note, Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physician Providers: Does 
Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. REV. 1219, 1244 (1986).  
See Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional 
Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595, 655 (May 1982). 
167By the term “supervision consultation” the author means that the physician is lacking a 
certain expertise that another physician possesses.  Therefore when the original physician calls 
in the consulting physician for an opinion on a course of treatment for a patient, the consulting 
physician is, in essence, supervising the original physician for that particular treatment. 
168Reindl, supra note 5, at 1244. 
169Falligant, supra note 7, at 13. 
170Id. 
171Reindl, supra note 5, at 1245-46. 
172See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (“A consumer has no interest in the preservation of a fixed number of competitors 
greater than the number required to assure his being able to buy at the competitive price.”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373. 
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for having the whole group of non-physician providers eliminated from 
competition.173  Therefore, depending on the circumstances, excluding an individual 
physician from the hospital staff is much less likely to have anticompetitive results in 
the physician-patient market,174 but excluding an entire group of non-physician 
providers protects the physicians from all competition that is provided by non-
physicians, such as substitutable services at lower costs.175 
The foregoing analyses illustrate that there is a chance that physicians reviewing 
non-physician providers will be acting for anticompetitive reasons.  This information 
justifies the distinction in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act as to when 
physicians receive immunity and when immunity is not applicable.  The application 
of immunity generally applies to non-physician providers; however, physician 
assistants are different from other non-physician providers, which justifies a different 
treatment for physician assistants under the HCQIA.  Physician assistants are 
different from other non-physician providers because they have the authority to act 
independently from their supervising physician. 
This independence provides greater risk to consumers; therefore, it is important 
to make sure that physician assistants are reviewed under close scrutiny to ensure 
high qualifications in order to protect consumers.  This type of review is similar to 
that which physicians are subjected to within the scope of the peer review process.  
Further, the process is similar to what Congress intended when it granted physicians 
immunity in the peer review of other physicians. 
Looking at immunity from the reviewing physicians’ point of view, immunity 
exists for peer review boards when reviewing physicians, as provided under the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act.  The type of immunity granted under the 
HCQIA, although not absolute, supports the objective of encouraging effective peer 
review.  The shortcoming of this immunity is that non-physician providers can abuse 
the process due to the lack of immunity for peer reviews of these health care 
practitioners. 
For example, a nurse midwife can threaten antitrust allegations against the review 
board for being denied staff privileges.  This may occur as a means to strong arm the 
board into granting privileges, even when the review board determined that the nurse 
midwife was not qualified to join the staff.  On the other hand, physicians being 
reviewed by these boards do not have this leverage because, under the HCQIA, 
review boards are provided immunity in these types of decisions.  The legislature 
allowed this imbalance when it eliminated the section of the statute that also granted 
immunity with respect to the review of non-physician providers. 
Physicians are not immune from antitrust liability with respect to the reviewing 
of non-physician providers.  Physician assistants should be treated differently from 
other non-physician providers and subject to peer review by physicians without the 
risk of the review board being subject to antitrust liability because this group has the 
                                                                
173Reindl, supra note 5, at 1246-47.  See Bhan v. NME Hosp. Inc., 772 F.2d 1467, 1471 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
174The author wishes to point out that this example may have an opposite effect.  For 
example, if the individual physician who is being denied staff privileges through the review 
process is part of a market that only contains a small number of physicians (rural areas), then 
the impact of that decision to deny privileges has significant ramifications on that market. 
175Reindl, supra note 5, at 1247. 
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training to perform “physician similar” services.  If this is to happen, physician 
assistants should be included in the definition of “physician” under the applicable 
provision of the HCQIA. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This note has attempted to familiarize the reader with the impact of the antitrust 
laws on the health care industry. The overall purpose of this note is to lead the reader 
to the conclusion that although the Health Care Quality Improvement Act has 
provided a framework regarding the peer review process, the HCQIA must be 
amended to address the issue of immunity in the peer review process regarding 
physician assistants. 
The author focused on the immunity aspect of the HCQIA with respect to when 
immunity is provided to review boards and when it does not apply, as in the case of a 
non-physician provider being reviewed by the peer review board.  This note 
addresses the changes that have occurred in health care, with an eye toward the 
impact of the antitrust decisions regarding staff privileges and non-physician 
providers.  Further, with the increasing numbers of physician assistants joining the 
ranks of hospital staffs, the note explores the impact that the peer review process will 
have on this unique group.  Finally, this author concludes that because physician 
assistants are different from other non-physician providers and that physician 
assistants should be included in the definition of “physician” under section 11151 of 
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. 
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